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What evolutionary function does self-regard serve? Hierometer theory, introduced here,
provides one answer: it helps individuals navigate status hierarchies, which feature zero-
sum contests that can be lost as well as won. In particular, self-regard tracks social
status to regulate behavioral assertiveness, augmenting or diminishing it to optimize
performance in such contests. Hierometer theory also offers a conceptual counterpoint
that helps resolve ambiguities in sociometer theory, which offers a complementary
account of self-regard’s evolutionary function. In two large-scale cross-sectional studies,
we operationalized theoretically relevant variables at three distinct levels of analysis,
namely, social (relations: status, inclusion), psychological (self-regard: self-esteem,
narcissism), and behavioral (strategy: assertiveness, affiliativeness). Correlational and
mediational analyses consistently supported hierometer theory, but offered only mixed
support for sociometer theory, including when controlling for confounding constructs
(anxiety, depression). We interpret our results in terms of a broader agency-communion
framework.
Keywords: hierometer theory, sociometer theory, status, inclusion, self-regard, self-esteem, narcissism,
assertiveness
INTRODUCTION
The human self is notoriously hard to pin down. Frustrated, some modern philosophers have
questioned its very existence (e.g., Metzinger, 2003). Yet the self still somehow matters: people
want their self, whatever it is, to be “good.” In other words, they want to achieve positive self-
regard (Sedikides and Gregg, 2008).1 And understandably so: positive self-regard provokes pleasant
feelings whereas negative self-regard provokes painful ones (Gregg et al., 2011).
But why should such a hedonic contingency exist in the first place? Otherwise put, what
ultimate function might self-regard serve? Various theories have addressed this question. For
1The terms self-regard and self-esteem are often used interchangeably. Here, we use the term self-regard as an umbrella term
to denote any global evaluation of the self, and the terms self-esteem and narcissism to refer to two types of self-regard. We
are not the first to characterize self-esteem and narcissism as alternative ways of evaluating the self; several other researchers
have also made this distinction (Baumeister et al., 2003; Kernis, 2003; Paulhus et al., 2004). We elaborate on these distinctions
later, but mention them immediately to pre-empt confusion. To anticipate one of our key contentions: we shall argue on
theoretical grounds that self-esteem and narcissism serve different functional roles in social life.
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example, terror management theory (Pyszczynski et al., 2004)
claims that the purpose of self-regard is to buffer the potentially
paralyzing terror that humans experience on contemplating
death. Alternatively, self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan,
2000) claims that self-regard does not serve any specific purpose,
but that its character depends on whether or not the social
environment satisfies fundamental needs.
However, perhaps the leading contemporary account of the
function of self-regard is provided by sociometer theory (Leary
et al., 1995). This posits that self-regard operates as part of an
adaptive psychological system that fitted ancestral human beings
to social living. In this paper, both to address ambiguities in
sociometer theory, and to make new intellectual headway, we
introduce a novel alternative account of self-regard’s evolutionary
function: hierometer theory. We outline the fundamentals about
both hierometer theory and sociometer theory and review the
empirical evidence for them. We then report on a research
program evaluating whether and to what extent patterns of
association between variables at three different levels of analysis
(social, psychological, behavioral) tend to confirm or infirm each
of the theories.
Sociometer Theory: Theoretical Outline
Sociometer theory starts from the premise that human beings
have a fundamental need to belong (Baumeister and Leary,
1995). Satisfying this need is advantageous: group members,
when cooperating, afford one another significant opportunities
for mutual gain (von Mises, 1963; Nowak and Highfield, 2011;
Wilson, 2012). Accordingly, if individuals are excluded from key
social networks, their prospects for surviving and reproducing
are impaired. It is therefore plausible to hypothesize that a
dedicated psychological system evolved to encourage social
acceptance (Leary et al., 1995). Such a system would serve two
complementary functions, which we here label indicative and
imperative.
The indicative function would be to track an individual’s
level of social acceptance (or, more anthropomorphically, to
“monitor” it). Logically, to enjoy the benefits that accrue
from mutually supportive relationships, some level of social
acceptance is required. To the extent that individuals achieve
such social acceptance, they will enjoy higher relational value,
defined as the extent to which (they believe that) other group
members consider it worthwhile to associate with them (Leary,
1999, 2005). Accordingly, a system designed to track one’s
social acceptance—in particular, to pick up on interpersonal
cues that might portend lower relational value—would be
useful. If such cues were detected, the relevant imperative
function of the system would be triggered. It would propel
an individual to act so as to meet a minimal level of social
acceptance. In particular, if social acceptance diverged from this
minimum, then the system would seek to reduce this divergence,
by prompting an individual to engage in remedial prosocial
behaviors.
Sociometer theory contends that self-regard—more
specifically, self-esteem—serves both these functions. Initially, it
tracks levels of social acceptance, by rising and falling in tandem
with them (i.e., its indicative function). A fall in self-esteem sends
an intrapsychic signal that one’s social acceptance has dropped,
perhaps critically. This signal, if sufficiently urgent, motivates
individuals to act in ways that restore or reinforce social
acceptance (i.e., its imperative function). Thus, the sociometer
system is said to operate rather like the digestive system: an
empty stomach (cf. low social acceptance) leads to unpleasant
hunger pangs (cf. low self-esteem) that prompt one to fill one’s
stomach by ingesting food (cf. regain social acceptance by acting
prosocially). Fundamentally, then, sociometer theory is a theory
of insiders and outsiders.
Sociometer Theory: Empirical Evidence
Sociometer theory enjoys empirical support. In particular, there is
good evidence that self-esteem serves its hypothesized indicative
function, and mixed evidence that it serves its hypothesized
imperative function.
Indicative Function: Tracking Social
Acceptance
Consistent with sociometer theory, self-esteem covaries with
perceptions of social acceptance and with levels of social
connectivity (Leary et al., 1995; Leary et al., 2001, Study 3;
Denissen et al., 2008, Study 5). Self-esteem is also higher to the
extent that individuals believe that they possess traits liable to
promote social acceptance or social approval (MacDonald et al.,
2003; Anthony et al., 2007a). In addition, anticipated levels of
self-esteem—after performing various actions, or after various
events occur—covary with how individuals expect others will
react ( Leary et al., 1995, Studies 1 and 2; Koch and Shepperd,
2008, Studies 3 and 4). Finally, receiving rejection feedback, real
or imagined, from personal or impersonal sources, lowers self-
esteem (Leary et al., 1998; Zadro et al., 2004; but see Blackhart
et al., 2009; Bernstein et al., 2013).
Imperative Function: Prompting
Affiliative Behavior
Consistent with sociometer theory, socially excluded individuals
evaluate others more favorably, express a stronger desire to
work with them, and report a greater interest in making new
friends (Maner et al., 2007). They also conform more to collective
opinion (Williams et al., 2000) and tailor their purchases toward
products that promote inclusion (Mead et al., 2011). In addition,
individuals with low self-esteem opt to join groups only when
acceptance in them is guaranteed or undemanding, consistent
with their being unwilling to risk further rejection (Haupt and
Leary, 1997; Anthony et al., 2007b).
Contrary to sociometer theory, however, social exclusion leads
individuals to derogate those who exclude them (Leary et al.,
1995; Bourgeois and Leary, 2001), reduces their empathy for and
willingness to help others generally (Twenge et al., 2007), and
increases their overall levels of hostility and aggression (Twenge
et al., 2001; Buckley et al., 2004). Moreover, individuals with low
self-esteem are relatively less likely to initiate social interactions
and new relationships (Baumeister et al., 2003; Anthony et al.,
2007b). Such anti-social reactions seem unlikely to promote
social acceptance or augment relational value.
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Hierometer Theory: Theoretical Outline
Like sociometer theory, hierometer theory proposes that self-
regard serves an evolutionary function. Unlike sociometer
theory, it proposes that this function is to navigate status
hierarchies. Specifically, hierometer theory proposes that self-
regard operates both indicatively—by tracking levels of social
status—and imperatively—by regulating levels of status pursuit
(Figure 1).
Status hierarchies are pervasive (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999;
Sapolsky, 2005). They exist in both humans and animals, in
simple and complex societies, and in formal and informal groups
(Mazur, 1985; Anderson et al., 2001, 2006). Moreover, these
hierarchies matter: higher-status individuals enjoy better health
and well-being (Marmot, 2004; Sapolsky, 2005), a wider choice
of romantic partners (Betzig, 1986), and greater reproductive
success (von Rueden et al., 2008, 2011).
Given the significance of status hierarchies, a dedicated
psychological system is liable to have evolved to help individuals
navigate them successfully (cf. Gilbert, 2000; Sloman, 2008).
Certainly, high status is desirable given the benefits it brings, and
the desire to achieve it is often considered fundamental (Barkow,
1975, 1980; Frank, 1985; Marmot, 2004; Anderson et al., 2015).
Nonetheless, the indiscriminate pursuit of ever higher status
is not adaptive. This is because competing for status involves
entry into zero-sum contests that can be lost as well as won.
Accordingly, the pursuit of status is risky. Potential costs range
from the psychologically uncomfortable (Ridgeway and Berger,
1986) to the physically lethal (Wrangham and Wilson, 2004). The
upshot is that individuals must pursue status judiciously.
Consider, by analogy, the game of poker (Sklansky, 1994).
Here, players compete to win a pot of money. Each player is dealt
a private hand of cards, some of which, in certain combinations,
are of higher value than others, leading to “good hands” versus
“bad hands.” One player begins the round by placing a bet, and
all players then respond in turn. Each player may either raise (i.e.,
increase the amount bet), fold (i.e., opt out of the round, losing
the amount bet), or check (i.e., stay in the game, matching the
amount bet). The round continues until only one player remains,
who then wins the pot, or until two or more players remain, in
which case the player with the best hand then wins the pot in a
public showdown.
In poker, players play each round by considering their own
cards, their opponents’ likely cards, and the relevant stakes.
On this basis, they decide to raise or fold (checking being
the intermediate option). Similarly, in social life, individuals
navigate status hierarchies by considering their own abilities,
their opponents’ likely abilities, and the costs and benefits
of competition. On this basis, they decide whether or not
to enter a contest, and whether or not to persist in it. In
poker, players generally adopt the strategy of raising when
their hands seem comparatively good, and folding when
their hands seem comparatively poor. That is, they “know
when to hold ‘em, know when to fold ‘em” (Schlitz, 1978).
Similarly, in social life, people generally adopt the strategy of
engaging in contests they expect to win and avoiding contests
they expect to lose (Sloman and Price, 1987; Gilbert et al.,
1995). That is, individuals, based on their best reckonings,
either escalate (i.e., intensify) contests or de-escalate (i.e.,
defuse) contests. In humans, escalation requires more assertive
behavior, whether in attack or defense; de-escalation, in contrast,
requires more acquiescent behavior, whether in surrender or
withdrawal. These alternative behavioral strategies have also
been termed hawk and dove (Maynard Smith, 1982). The
former offers higher reward at greater risk, the latter lower
reward at lesser risk. Both can be adaptive, depending on the
circumstances.
Hierometer theory proposes that higher self-regard prompts
the adoption of more hawkish strategies, and lower self-regard
the adoption of more dovish ones. As such, self-regard is part of
a dedicated system that evolved to regulate behavior adaptively
when navigating status hierarchies. To be adaptive, self-regard
must predict the relative success of hawkish strategies when
higher, and of dovish strategies when lower. Logically, this
can only be the case if self-regard does indeed track some
characteristic that predicts the relative success of those strategies.
What could that characteristic be? Social status is a leading
contender. Here, we define it as the respect, admiration, and
importance that society at large confers upon an individual
(Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Fiske, 2010; Huo et al., 2010).
Higher-status individuals can afford to adopt more hawkish
strategies. This is because, in order for them to have attained
higher status in the first place, several factors would have had
to operate in their favor. Such factors might have included a
fund of pre-existing resources to draw on (Magee and Galinsky,
2008), or a superior ability to produce goods and services
(Klein, 2010). Where present, such propitious factors would
objectively increase the likelihood that adopting a hawkish
strategy—that is, escalating contests through assertive behavior—
would work better. In poker terms, higher-status individuals
would hold a “good hand,” making it more adaptive for them
to “raise.” However, where such factors are absent, as they
often are among lower-status individuals, a dovish strategy—
de-escalating contests through acquiescent behavior—would
work better. In poker terms, lower-status individuals would
hold a “poor hand,” making it more adaptive for them to
“fold.”
Note here some key differences between hierometer theory
and dominance theory (Barkow, 1975, 1980), another alternative
to sociometer theory (e.g., Leary et al., 2001). Dominance
theory, plausibly interpreted, states that self-esteem tracks, not
levels of social acceptance or relational value, but instead
levels of “dominance” or “prestige,” by which some social
or psychological, rather than behavioral, construct is meant.
For example, according to Barkow (1975), “[to] evaluate the
self as higher than others is to maintain self-esteem (p.
554)” and “[. . .] approbation and respect permit the self
to evaluate itself as being of higher standing than others,
thereby maintaining self-esteem (p. 555–556, italics added).”
Barkow (1980) proposes that people pursue various “prestige
strategies” to maintain their standing, and draws analogies
with social rank in other species. Accordingly, the term
“status” might be reasonably substituted for “dominance” or
“prestige” here, especially given the key role that attention
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and respect play in Barkow’s characterization (Anderson
et al., 2001, 2006; Fiske, 2010). If so, then dominance
theory, like hierometer theory, states that higher social status
promotes higher self-esteem. However, insofar as dominance
theory emphasizes the critical importance of social status
for reproductive success, it can be interpreted as proposing
that self-regard operates homeostatically, motivating individuals
to attain and maintain sufficient levels of social status
(Anderson et al., 2015), much as sociometer theory proposes
happens with respect to levels of social inclusion (Baumeister
and Leary, 1995). In contrast, hierometer theory proposes
that self-regard operates non-homeostatically, regulating the
behavior strategies that individuals adopt so that they match
rather than modify their current status. Hence, dominance
theory and hierometer theory make distinct predictions.
The former predicts that lower self-regard, tracking lower
status, should lead to increased behavioral assertiveness,
as a form of adaptive compensation. The latter predicts
that lower self-regard, tracking lower status, should lead to
increased behavioral acquiescence, as a form of adaptive
consolidation. Thus, hierometer theory, far from being a
restatement of dominance theory, is an empirically testable
alternative to it.
In brief, hierometer theory proposes that self-regard acts as
a crucial psychological mediator: it bridges the gap between
social status and assertive behavior by tracking the former and
regulating the latter, thereby enabling individuals to navigate
status hierarchies, as their status best allows. Fundamentally,
then, hierometer theory is a theory of winners and losers.
Hierometer Theory: Existing Evidence
Hierometer theory already enjoys some empirical support.
Assorted findings are consistent with self-regard serving both its
hypothesized indicative and imperative functions.
Indicative Function: Tracking Social
Status
Socioeconomic indicators (i.e., income) modestly predict trait
self-esteem (Twenge and Campbell, 2002). In addition, state
self-esteem increases or decreases respectively when students
are notified of academic successes or failures (Crocker et al.,
2002, 2003), when job candidates encounter a more or less
smartly dressed competitor (Morse and Gergen, 1970), and
when participants are assigned to the roles of supervisors or
subordinates (Wojciszke and Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007, Study
2). Finally, from a neurological point of view, some brain circuits
seem to be specialized to identifying one’s place in the status
hierarchy (Zink et al., 2008).
Imperative Function: Regulating
Assertive Behavior
Trait self-esteem positively predicts self-reports of more
assertive behavior (“interpersonal dominance”), both on
standard questionnaires (Leary et al., 2001) and on behavioral
vignettes (De Waal-Andrews, 2012, unpublished). In
addition, when participants are alternately instructed to
recall occasions on which they “felt secure in their self-
worth” versus “felt like a failure”—thereby manipulating their
state self-esteem—they recall more assertive behaviors and
acquiescent behaviors respectively (De Waal-Andrews, 2012,
unpublished).
Several studies also show that higher and lower self-regard are
respectively associated with the adoption of more risk-seeking
and risk-averse strategies. For example, individuals with higher
self-esteem prefer risky gambles over certain gains on a monetary
task (Josephs et al., 1992), at least when potentially regret-
inducing feedback on foregone options is offered. Moreover,
when telling a joke or completing a creativity test, they are
more likely to “go for gold” than to “play it safe”—an effect
amplified under conditions of psychological threat (Landau
and Greenberg, 2006). Individuals with high self-esteem also
make riskier personal decisions on interpersonal vignettes even
controlling for trait anxiety, with the effect being partly mediated
by success expectancies and failure-related feelings (Wray and
Stone, 2005).
The Sociometer and the Hierometer:
Toward Conceptual Coordination
How do sociometer theory and hierometer theory relate to one
another? Are they antagonistic or complementary? The answer, it
turns out, hangs on how one interprets sociometer theory, and on
which formulation of it one emphasizes, for one ends up dealing
with theoretical constructs that are broader or narrower in scope,
and defined with greater or lesser precision. Our summary of
sociometer theory above blends (intentionally) two versions of the
theory, original and revised.
The original version of sociometer theory (Leary and Downs,
1995; Leary et al., 1995) emphasizes how self-esteem tracks
social acceptance, by which is implied some sort of community
belongingness, or social inclusion. For example, Leary (2004,
p. 374), recounting the original version, states that “only those
who have established mutually supportive relationships with
people can count on others’ assistance in terms of food sharing,
physical protection, and care when ill, injured, or old. An
individual who does not maintain a minimal level of social
acceptance is at a decided disadvantage compared to one who
is warmly accepted [. . .] humans [. . .] possess a strong and
pervasive need for acceptance and belongingness [. . .] [italics
added].”
In contrast, the revised version (Leary and Baumeister, 2000)
emphasizes how self-esteem tracks relational value, defined as the
degree to which other people regard their relationship with the
individual as important or valuable overall, for whatever reason.
For example, Leary (2005, p. 86) states that “Many kinds of events
can lower people’s self-esteem—failure, rejection, embarrassing
situations, negative evaluations, being outperformed by others,
and so on—but, from the standpoint of sociometer theory, these
all involve events that potentially lower people’s relational value
in the eyes of others [italics added]” (see also Kirkpatrick and
Ellis, 2001; Leary et al., 2001, p. 907).
Accordingly, the revised version of sociometer theory is
pitched at a broader level of analysis than the original version
is. Relational value, as a construct, is broad enough to cover
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any reason for self-esteem’s rising and falling that involves
social interaction. However, social inclusion, as a construct
if understood as community belongingness, is narrower, and
excludes many such reasons. In particular, one can enjoy high
status, by being respected or admired for being competent,
without enjoying high inclusion, by being liked or loved for
being warm—and vice versa (Cuddy et al., 2008). However,
the evidence suggests that status, so conceived, can affect self-
esteem independently of inclusion, so conceived (e.g., Leary et al.,
2001: Study 1; Koch and Shepperd, 2008). Consequently, the
original version of sociometer theory cannot account for such
findings, only the revised version. More generally, the original
version characterizes self-esteem primarily in terms of the super-
dimension of communion, which comprises such factors as
inclusion, warmth, and affiliativeness, rather than in terms of
the (orthogonal) super-dimension of agency, which comprises
such factors as status, competence, and assertiveness (Foa, 1961;
Wiggins, 1979; McCrae and Costa, 1989; Moskowitz, 1994;
Cuddy et al., 2008; Huo et al., 2010). This is problematic, because
self-esteem may actually be more agency-based. For example,
Wojciszke et al. (2011) found that self-ascribed agentic traits
(e.g., “clever”) predicted self-esteem better than self-ascribed
communal traits (e.g., “good-natured”; though see Gebauer et al.,
2013, for some moderators). In addition, Zeigler-Hill (2010)
reported that eight standard measures of self-regard were at least
as strongly linked to agentic traits as they were to communal ones.
Hence, it is important to be theoretically precise about
self-esteem’s agentic role. The original version of sociometer
theory neglects it by emphasizing community belongingness.
The revised version partly rectifies this neglect by allowing
for the possibility of many types of relational value. However,
the revised theory still does not specify the details of self-
esteem’s agentic role, nor does it differentiate self-esteem’s agentic
role from its communal role. Hierometer theory breaks new
theoretical ground by specifying precisely how (social) status,
(psychological) self-esteem, and (behavioral) assertiveness might
interact as part of an evolutionarily adaptive system. Moreover,
with this agentic role specified, the communal role played by
self-esteem comes into sharper focus. In particular, the original
version of sociometer theory can be plausibly interpreted as
specifying precisely how (social) inclusion, (psychological) self-
esteem, and (behavioral) affiliativeness might interact as part of
evolutionarily adaptive system. Thereafter, it becomes possible
to empirically test whether and to what extent these agentic
and communal roles are supported or refuted by patterns of
empirically observed correlations.
A further virtue of hierometer theory’s specificity is that,
in clearly distinguishing between different levels of analysis,
including in the original version of sociometer theory, it
encourages the operationalization of constructs at corresponding
levels, a finesse that some prior research has not observed.
For example, Koch and Shepperd (2008), in testing how
well-acceptance (i.e., inclusion) and competence independently
predicted self-esteem, although they tested a communal construct
against an agentic one, nonetheless confounded social and
psychological levels of analysis, respectively. Arguably, they
should have tested how inclusion versus status, or competence
versus warmth, predicted self-esteem. In addition, Anthony
et al. (2007a), when testing how well different types of traits—
namely, “communal qualities” versus “social commodities”—
independently predicted self-esteem, listed “popular” and “social
status” as examples of the latter. However, popularity and status
are not only psychological in nature, but also social.
Hierometer Theory: Encompassing
Narcissism Too
We have so far alternated between using the term “self-
regard,” mainly in respect of hierometer theory, and the term
“self-esteem,” mainly in respect of sociometer theory. And
intentionally so: for self-regard is a broader construct than self-
esteem, and hierometer theory explicitly allows for the possibility
that other types of self-regard might serve its prescribed
indicative and imperative functions. We have one particular
candidate in mind: narcissism.
Narcissism, for our purposes, is a normally distributed
trait, and may be regarded as the continuous subclinical
counterpart of the categorical personality disorder (Baumeister
et al., 2003; Kernis, 2003; Campbell and Foster, 2007; Miller
et al., 2014). Its antecedents, correlations, and consequences have
been extensively researched (Paulhus et al., 2004; Rhodewalt
and Peterson, 2009; Campbell and Miller, 2011), often in
conjunction with self-esteem (Sedikides et al., 2004; Lee et al.,
2013, Study 1). As most commonly operationalized (but see
Pincus et al., 2009, for one of several alternatives), narcissism
entails an interest in leadership and authority, a propensity
for grandiosity and exhibitionism, and a sense of entitlement
combined with a manipulative streak (Raskin and Hall, 1981;
Ackerman et al., 2011). In romantic relationships, moreover,
narcissists prefer being admired over being loved, pursue short-
term rather than long-term relationships, and evaluate mates
based on external characteristics rather than inner qualities
(Campbell, 1999; Brunell and Campbell, 2011; Holtzman and
Strube, 2011). Accordingly, narcissism has been hypothesized to
involve a surfeit of agency alongside a deficit in communion
(Campbell et al., 2002; Sedikides et al., 2002; Morf et al., 2011).
If this characterization is correct, then one might expect
narcissism to be particularly likely to track social status and
regulate assertive behavior, as hierometer theory specifies.
Conversely, one might expect narcissism to be less likely
to track social inclusion and regulate affiliative behavior,
as sociometer theory specifies. Thus, hierometer theory, by
encompassing narcissism too, opens up fruitful avenues for
empirical investigation (cf. Back et al., 2009) and adds to the
literature exploring narcissism’s evolutionary origins (Holtzman
and Strube, 2011).
It should be noted that attempts have been made to account for
narcissism in terms of sociometer theory. In particular, narcissism
in this connection has been described as a dysfunction, where
those who exhibit it believe that “others regard them more
favorably and accept them more enthusiastically than is, in fact,
the case” (Leary and Downs, 1995, p. 138). In other words, levels
of self-regard in narcissists are no longer an accurate guide to
their objective levels of social inclusion or relational value. But
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if so, then sociometer theory does not so much account for
narcissism as undergo qualification in the light of its existence; for
in narcissists, self-regard does not function as sociometer theory
prescribes. In contrast, hierometer theory offers a positive and
constructive account of the function of narcissism, which can be
put to the empirical test.
To be clear, we regard self-esteem as the prototypical form
of self-regard, and thus the primary construct to consider
in evaluating functional theories. Nonetheless, narcissism is
still perhaps the best known subtype of self-regard, and its
concurrent consideration—especially given the affinity between
the agentic emphasis of hierometer theory and the agentic roots
of narcissism—is well-justified, and potentially enlightening.
Goals and Features of the Current
Research
Here, we report a systematic program of correlational research
with several interlocking goals and features.
First, the research program is designed to test hierometer
theory, by examining whether and to what extent its core
constructs—status, self-regard, and assertiveness—interrelate as
predicted. Second, it is designed to test sociometer theory in an
exactly parallel manner. Do its core constructs—inclusion, self-
regard, and affiliativeness—also interrelate as predicted? Third,
the program operationalizes relevant constructs at various levels
of analysis, by distinguishing among two types of social relations
(i.e., status, inclusion), psychological self-perception (i.e., self-
esteem, narcissism), and behavioral strategy (i.e., assertiveness,
affiliativeness). Fourth, the program features a comprehensive
analytic approach, to meet the goals above. To begin with,
it looks at simple and partial correlations between (a) social
relations and self-regard, and (b) self-regard and behavioral
strategy. This permits separate tests of whether the data support
or refute the indicative and imperative functions hypothesized
by hierometer theory and sociometer theory. Fifth, the program
proceeds to test—for the first time we believe—whether and
to what extent self-regard mediates the link between social
relations and interpersonal behavior, as hierometer theory and
sociometer theory respectively predict. Sixth, in testing the above,
the program investigates self-regard, not only in its standard
form as self-esteem, but also in a grandiose form as narcissism.
Finally, the program proceeds to investigate whether and to what
extent any empirically confirmed links to self-esteem continue to
obtain after statistically controlling for clinical variables known to
overlap with self-esteem—in particular, depression and anxiety—
which have themselves, in the context of evolutionary theory,
been hypothesized to serve similar indicative and imperative
functions (Price et al., 1994; Sloman, 2008).
It should be understood that this program of research
represents the first step in a process of validating hierometer
theory in the comparative context of sociometer theory. It allows
for the possibility that patterns could emerge that are at odds
with one or both theories, and enables tests of whether the
data fit one theory better than another or both equally. Note
that a complementary program of experimental research is also
underway to test the hypothesized causal pathways between the
social, psychological, and behavioral variables more definitively.
For example, Mahadevan et al. (2015) found that expectations
of higher and lower future social status or inclusion—both
manipulated via bogus test feedback—independently led to
higher and lower self-esteem, thereby validating the indicative
functions of self-esteem specified by both hierometer theory and
sociometer theory.
Hypotheses
In sum, in regards to hierometer theory, we hypothesized that
status would correlate positively with self-esteem as well as
narcissism; that self-esteem and narcissism would each correlate
positively with assertiveness; and that self-esteem and narcissism
would each mediate the link between status and assertiveness.
In regards to sociometer theory, we hypothesized that inclusion
would correlate positively with self-esteem. Evidence for the link
between self-esteem and affiliativeness is mixed. However, as low
self-esteem is theorized to prompt greater affiliativeness in order
to repair levels of social inclusion, we tentatively hypothesized
that self-esteem would correlate negatively with affiliativeness.
Furthermore, we hypothesized that self-esteem would mediate
the link between inclusion and affiliativeness.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Overview
We conducted two studies. Each featured shared and unique
elements. The shared elements were designed repeatedly
to test our focal hypotheses concerning hierometer theory
and sociometer theory. To this end, both studies assessed
social relations (status and inclusion), psychological self-
perception (self-esteem and narcissism), and behavioral strategy
(assertiveness and affiliativeness). The unique elements of the
studies were designed to rule out plausible alternative hypotheses
and to advance theoretical understanding. To this end, Study 1
also assessed depression, and Study 2 additionally also anxiety.
Regarding the shared elements of both studies, we present their
associated analyses in parallel. This makes for greater brevity and
permits the replicability of findings to be scrutinized. Regarding
the unique elements of both studies, we present their associated
analyses in sequence. This makes for a systematic analytic
progression.
Platform, Procedure, Precautions, and
Participants
All studies were run online. They were created and administered
using the designated university internet survey software.
Participants were recruited via CrowdFlowerTM, a leading
crowdsourcing site, and took part for a nominal fee, on condition
they were aged 18 years or above and were fluent in
English. Before taking part, participants read some introductory
information and indicated their consent; afterward, they read a
debriefing statement. The studies were approved by the Research
Ethics Committee of the University of Southampton, UK.
Crowdsourcing typically yields high-quality data, both rapidly
and cheaply, from diverse participants (Buhrmester et al., 2011;
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Germine et al., 2012). Nonetheless, it is prudent to exclude
participants whose data are, for any of several reasons, suspect.
Here, we excluded participants if: (a) their IP address appeared
more than once in the dataset (suggesting multiple completions);
(b) they completed the survey in less than half the median survey
time (suggesting an absence of reflection); (c) they completed all
items identically on any questionnaire featuring both forward-
scored and reverse-scored items (suggesting mindless button-
clicking); (d) their self-reported English-proficiency was poor or
very poor; (e) they were younger than 18; and (f) they omitted to
answer more than 5% of questionnaire items.
Table 1 shows sample demographics before and after
screening, and the percentage excluded for each reason. As some
participants were excluded for multiple reasons, the sum of the
individual percentages excluded exceeds the total percentage.
Over 85% of the original participants were retained. Of these,
about two-thirds were female, nine-10ths resident in the USA,
and the majority aged between 20 and 40.2 We report analyses
conducted on screened data, although analyses conducted on
unscreened data yielded inferentially equivalent results.
Measures
Social Relations
We assessed status and inclusion, respectively, with structurally
validated 8- and 9-item scales. These scales were originally
developed by Huo et al. (2010) and enhanced by Mahadevan
et al. (2015) with additional items that gave a broader conceptual
coverage and achieved a superior factor solution. Each item began
with the stem “Most of the time I feel that people. . .” and ended
with a different sentence completion (e.g., status: “. . .see me as
2Given that Gebauer et al. (2013) found a stronger correlation between self-esteem
and self-ascribed agentic traits (e.g., ambitious) for men, and between self-esteem
and self-ascribed communal traits (e.g., caring) for women, we also tested whether
gender moderated the suite of effects we report below. In general, equivalently
significant and substantial effects were obtained for both genders. Given the
exposition is already lengthy, interested readers may contact the authors for further
details.
TABLE 1 | Participant profile.
Variable Study 1 Study 2
Total sample size 712 789
Duplicate IP addresses 2.7% 2.9%
Age <18 years 0.8% 1.0%
Poor reported English
proficiency
0.7% 1.4%
Overly rapid completion (< half
median completion time)
3.7% 5.8%
>5% blank 4.8% 4.2%
Stereotyped responses 2.5% 3.7%
Total excluded 12.1% 13.8%
Screened sample size 626 680
Gender (male) 37.5% 39.1%
Mean age (in years) 34.5 32.3
SD age (in years) 12.9 12.8
U.S. residence 91.2% 86.5%
an important person”; inclusion: “. . .like me as a person”). Both
scales featured a five-point response format (1= strongly disagree,
5= strongly agree).
Psychological Self-Regard
We assessed self-esteem with the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). We assessed narcissism with one
of two versions of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory: the
original 40-item (multifactorial) version (NPI-40: Raskin and
Hall, 1981; Studies 1 and 3) or the abbreviated (unifactorial) 16-
item version (NPI-16; Ames et al., 2006; Study 2).3 Both the RSES
and the NPI are leading measures of self-regard (Byrne, 1996;
Twenge et al., 2008). The RSES featured a five-point response
format (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), and the NPI
a six-point sliding scale, located between bipolar options (cf. Lee
et al., 2013). Sample items: “I feel that I have a number of good
qualities” (RSES); “I know that I am good because everybody
keeps telling me so” versus “When people compliment me I
sometimes get embarrassed” (NPI).
Behavioral Strategy
We assessed assertiveness and affiliativeness using the 48-
item Social Behavior Inventory (SBI; Moskowitz, 1994). The
SBI consists of four 12-item subscales that respectively assess
behaviors originally labeled dominant, submissive, agreeable, and
quarrelsome (although we prefer the labels assertive, acquiescent,
affiliative, and alienating, which emphasize interpersonal action
over individual disposition, and avoid conceptual confounds
[e.g., dominant implies a social rank]). The SBI featured a
six-point response format (1 = very unlike me, 6 = very like
me). Sample items: “I speak in a clear, firm voice” (dominant);
“I do not express disagreement” (submissive); “I compliment
or praise other people” (agreeable); and “I criticize others”
(quarrelsome). To derive an overall assertiveness index, we
subtracted participants’ mean score on the submissive subscale
from their mean score on the dominant subscale; to derive an
overall affiliativeness index, we subtracted participants’ mean
score on the quarrelsome subscale from their mean score on the
agreeable subscale.
Depression
We assessed depression in two ways: with the 21-item Beck
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) and with
the 20-item Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale
(CES-D; Radloff, 1977). The BDI-II lists different symptoms,
followed by topic-specific response options each time. Sample
item: “Sadness”: (1 = I do not feel sad; 2 = I feel sad some of
the time; 3 = I am sad all the time; 4 = I am so sad or unhappy
I can’t stand it). The CES-D lists different statements about
3Given the multifactorial nature of the NPI-40 in Study 2, we also tested whether
the effects we report below obtained similarly or differently for the three key facets
of narcissism isolated by Ackerman et al. (2011), namely, leadership/authority,
grandiosity/exhibitionism, and exploitativeness/entitlement (see also Lee et al.,
2013). Although effects obtained for overall narcissism ultimately replicated across
all facets, exploitativeness/entitlement was less strongly related to agentic variables
(e.g., status, assertiveness), and more negatively related to communal variables
(e.g., inclusion, affiliativeness). Again, given the length of the exposition, interested
readers are encouraged to contact the authors for further details. The unifactorial
nature of the NPI-16 obviated any such supplementary analysis in Study 1.
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symptoms, followed by standard response options. Sample item:
I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me” (1=Never
or hardly ever; 2=Occasionally, now and then; 3= A good deal of
the time; 4=Mostly or all of the time). Given the high correlation
between the BDI-II and the CES-D, r(624)= 0.85, p < 0.0001, we
created a single composite measure, by standardizing scores on
each and averaging the result.
Anxiety
We assessed anxiety in two ways: with the 21-item Beck Anxiety
Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988) and with the 20-item trait
version of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger
et al., 1983). Both measures cover a range of anxiety symptoms
(e.g., nervousness, light-headedness, trembling), are suitable
for clinical and non-clinical samples, and feature four-point
response formats. The BAI lists the names of different anxiety
symptoms, and has respondents indicate their severity. Sample
item: “Numbness or tingling” (1 = NOT AT ALL: It didn’t
bother me in the slightest; 2 = MILDLY: It didn’t bother me
much; 3 = MODERATELY: It wasn’t pleasant at times; and
4 = SEVERLY: It bothered me a lot). The STAI lists different
statements about dispositional anxiety, and has respondents
indicate their level of agreement. All statements began with the
sentence stem “In general....” Sample item: “. . .I worry over
possible misfortunes” (1= Not at all; 2= A little; 3= Somewhat;
and 4=Very much so). Again, given the high correlation between
the BAI and the STAI, r(678) = 0.64, p < 0.0001, we created a
single composite measure, by standardizing scores on each and
averaging the result.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 summarizes the key aspects of all measures (means,
standard deviations, internal consistencies, deviations from
midpoint). In no case did any measure fall short of conventional
psychometric desiderata. Moreover, no variable evinced a
distribution that was atypical for everyday populations (e.g.,
levels of self-esteem were significantly higher than the midpoint,
and levels of narcissism were significantly lower than the
midpoint).
Indicative Function: Social Relations and
Psychological Self-Regard
Both hierometer theory and sociometer theory predict that levels
of psychological self-regard will track levels of social relations
(i.e., serve an indicative function). Hierometer theory specifically
predicts that higher status will lead to higher self-regard, either
as self-esteem or narcissism. Sociometer theory, in its original
version, specifically predicts that higher inclusion will lead to
higher self-regard in the form of self-esteem, though it makes
no prediction concerning narcissism (but see Leary and Downs,
1995). However, to the extent that narcissism, unlike regular
self-esteem, entails an agentic surfeit and a communal deficit,
narcissism should disproportionately track status over inclusion,
whereas self-esteem should track both more equitably.
The upper panel of Table 3 lists all correlations between the
two social relations variables (i.e., status and inclusion) and the
two self-regard variables (i.e., self-esteem and narcissism). These
appear in two forms: raw (first row) and partialed (second row).
The partial correlations between any pair of variables (e.g., status
and narcissism) controlled for overlapping variance attributable
to the other pair (e.g., inclusion and self-esteem).
Several patterns deserve note. First, all raw coefficients were
significantly positive. At first glance, then, the data are consistent
with both forms of self-regard simply tracking both forms of
social relations. The higher participants’ status or inclusion, the
higher their self-esteem or narcissism was too. Second, the same
raw coefficients were, within each study, always higher for self-
esteem than for narcissism. This suggests that self-esteem is,
overall, a more sensitive tracker of both status and inclusion.
Third, the raw coefficients were, within each study—and broken
down by self-esteem and narcissism individually—always at least
somewhat higher for status than for inclusion. This suggests that
self-regard tracks status at least as sensitively as inclusion. Finally,
the difference in raw coefficient size for correlations with status
and inclusion was greater for narcissism than it was for self-
esteem. This suggests that, compared to self-esteem, narcissism is
a relatively more sensitive tracker of status than inclusion (while
being an absolutely less sensitive tracker of both).
Nonetheless, status and inclusion correlated positively in
both studies—respective rs = 0.64 and 0.63, ps < 0.0001—as
did self-esteem and narcissism—respective rs = 0.43 and 0.30,
ps < 0.0001. Accordingly, we examined the partialed coefficients
to gage the crucial links between the statistically “purified”
variables.
Although predictably lower in magnitude, all partial
coefficients nonetheless remained positive and significant—with
one key and consistent exception: narcissism now correlated
negatively with inclusion, and significantly so in one out of
two studies. This suggests that, if anything, narcissism tracks
decrements in inclusion by increasing, not by decreasing
(like self-esteem). This novel finding underscores the value
of assessing self-regard in two different ways, and raises the
possibility that any functional link between self-regard and
inclusion may not be monolithic and unidirectional. The overall
picture is that, whereas self-esteem increases with better social
relations generally, narcissism increases with one form (status)
but decreases with the other form (inclusion). Otherwise, the
patterns obtained with partialed coefficients mirrored those
obtained with raw coefficients, suggesting identical conclusions.
In all, the patterns obtained were consistent with self-
regard serving the indicative functions specified by hierometer
theory (i.e., for self-esteem and narcissism) and by sociometer
theory (i.e., for self-esteem). Importantly, however, both forms
of self-regard independently covaried with status at least
as much as with inclusion; accordingly, self-regard, if it
tracks social relations, seems not only to track community
belongingness, but also and no less sensitively, achievement-
related standing. Moreover, the inverse link between narcissism
and inclusion complicates the empirical picture: it suggests
a new and unanticipated type of indicative function, not
easily accounted for in terms of the original version of
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TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of main variables.
Study 1 Study 2
Measures Scale M SD α M SD α
Status 1 – 5 3.21 ↑ 0.75 0.91 3.33 ↑ 0.75 0.91
Inclusion 1 – 5 3.68 ↑ 0.71 0.93 3.75 ↑ 0.67 0.92
Self-esteem 1 – 5 3.59 ↑ 0.84 0.92 3.61 ↑ 0.79 0.91
Narcissism 1 – 6 3.07 ↓ 0.71 0.92 3.03 ↓ 0.71 0.81
Assertiveness 1 – 6 3.80 ↑ 0.81 0.93 3.91 ↑ 0.76 0.92
Affiliativeness 1 – 6 4.48 ↑ 0.61 0.89 4.51 ↑ 0.59 0.88
Depression (BDI-II) 1 – 4 1.59 ↓ 0.54 0.94 – – –
Depression (CES-D) 1 – 4 1.88 ↓ 0.60 0.93 – – –
Anxiety (BAI) 1 – 4 – – – 1.81 ↓ 0.67 0.95
Anxiety (STAI) 1 – 4 – – – 2.15 ↓ 0.66 0.95
TABLE 3 | Raw and partial correlations between social relations, self-regard, and interpersonal behavior.
Study 1 Study 2
Self-esteem Narcissism Self-esteem Narcissism
Raw correlations
Status 0.63∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.35∗∗
Inclusion 0.55∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.17∗∗
Partial correlations
Status 0.35∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.25∗∗
Inclusion 0.25∗∗ −0.05 0.29∗∗ −0.11∗
Assertiveness Affiliativeness Assertiveness Affiliativeness
Raw correlations
Self-esteem 0.48∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.21∗∗
Narcissism 0.62∗∗ −0.17∗∗ 0.50∗∗ −0.34∗∗
Partial correlations
Self-esteem 0.29∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.32∗∗
Narcissism 0.50∗∗ −0.26∗∗ 0.40∗∗ −0.40∗∗
∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.001.
sociometer theory. The findings also support the characterization
of narcissism in terms of an agentic surfeit and communal
deficit.
Imperative Function: Psychological
Self-Regard and Behavioral Strategy
Both hierometer theory and sociometer theory predict that
levels of psychological self-regard will regulate behavioral
strategies (i.e., serve an imperative function). The lower
panel of Table 3 lists, for both studies, the correlations
between the two self-regard variables (i.e., self-esteem and
narcissism) and the two behavioral strategy variables (i.e.,
assertiveness and affiliativeness). Again, these appear in two
forms: raw (third row) and partialed (fourth row). The partial
correlations between any pair of variables (e.g., narcissism and
assertiveness) controlled for overlapping variance attributable
to the other pair (e.g., self-esteem and affiliativeness). Here,
assertiveness and affiliativeness emerged as largely orthogonal,
respective rs = −0.05 and −0.07, ps > 0.05. Nonetheless,
for the sake of consistency, we applied the same partialing
procedure.
All correlation coefficients were significant. For both raw
and partialed correlations, the higher participants’ self-esteem,
the higher was their assertiveness and affiliativeness; but the
higher their narcissism, the higher was their assertiveness and
the lower their affiliativeness. Thus, the data were consistent with
both forms of self-regard regulating both forms of behavioral
strategy, albeit in different ways. They suggest that whereas
self-esteem regulates assertiveness and affiliativeness similarly
(by making each rise as it rises), narcissism regulates them
differently (by making assertiveness rise, but affiliativeness fall, as
it rises).
As regards other patterns, the data did not strongly
support either form of self-regard being a more potent
regulator of behavioral strategies overall, or either form
of behavioral strategy being more potently regulated by
self-regard overall. The narcissism-assertiveness coefficients
were always (absolutely) the highest; the others were closer
in magnitude to one another, especially in their partialed
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form. Among the partialed coefficients, a cross-over trend
could be discerned, such that self-esteem covaried (slightly)
more strongly with affiliativeness than assertiveness, whereas
narcissism covaried (much) more strongly with assertiveness
than affiliativeness. As before, narcissism seemed to have
been characterized by agentic surfeit and a communal
deficit.
How then do these findings bear on the validity of the
hierometer theory and sociometer theory? As regards hierometer
theory, all the findings are fully consistent with it. As both
forms of self-regard increased, assertiveness increased; and as
both forms of self-regard decreased, assertiveness decreased.
These findings suggest a form of adaptive consolidation, with
higher or lower levels of self-regard inducing individuals to
adopt, respectively, a more assertive or acquiescent behavioral
strategy, in keeping with the competitive capacities liable to
be conferred by their higher or lower status, and tracked
by self-regard. In contrast, dominance theory (Barkow,
1975, 1980) arguably implies the reverse: lower levels of
self-regard should have prompted adaptive compensation,
inducing individuals to adopt a more assertive behavioral
strategy to augment their diminished status. Accordingly,
our findings support hierometer theory over dominance
theory.
As regards the original version of sociometer theory, the same
logic of adaptive compensation versus adaptive consolidation
applies, but concerning inclusion and affiliativeness rather
than status and assertiveness. Individuals whose self-esteem
is lower, due to their lower levels of inclusion, should
be more inclined to adopt affiliative behavioral strategies
designed to rectify their lower levels of inclusion, whereas
those whose self-esteem is higher, due to their higher levels
of inclusion, can afford to relax the imperative to affiliate.
However, our findings pointed toward the opposite conclusion:
levels of self-esteem covaried positively, not negatively, with
affiliativeness. This is consistent with a consolidatory rather
than a compensatory dynamic. Social exclusion seems to
have an alienating impact: it reduces affiliativeness, which
is arguably less adaptive in the absence of benevolent and
beneficent reciprocators. Such a dynamic would fit with some
empirical findings (e.g., Twenge et al., 2007), although not with
others (e.g., Maner et al., 2007). Persistent failure to achieve
inclusion—which our chronically oriented measures were liable
to assess—does seem to promote hostility (DeWall and Richman,
2011).
However, given that narcissism covaried negatively with
affiliativeness, it fitted the bill, sociometer-wise, where self-esteem
did not. In particular, as narcissism decreased, participants
adopted a more affiliative behavioral strategy. This suggests that
narcissism might operate in the imperative manner prescribed
by the original version of sociometer theory. However, as
noted above, narcissism does not operate in the prescribed
indicative manner: it also covaried negatively with social
inclusion. Hence, narcissism cannot entirely operate as the
original version of sociometer theory specifies self-esteem
should.
It might be objected that sociometer theory only properly
applies to state self-esteem, not to trait self-esteem; and indeed,
the bulk of research cited in support of sociometer references
state self-esteem (e.g., Leary, 2005). However, associations with
trait self-esteem have previously been marshaled in support of
sociometer in respect of its prescribed indicative functions (e.g.,
Leary et al., 1995, 2001; Anthony et al., 2007a; Denissen et al.,
2008). This makes it rhetorically difficult to object to their bearing
on its prescribed imperative functions also. A case would have
to be made for why—if sociometer theory is correct about social
inclusion being so essential for survival— individuals who are
chronically low in self-esteem, due to chronic social exclusion,
should not strive for re-inclusion by adopting a chronically
affiliative behavioral strategy.
In all, the patterns obtained were consistent with self-regard
serving the imperative functions specified by hierometer theory
(for self-esteem and narcissism) but not those specified by
sociometer theory (for self-esteem).
Mediational Analyses I: Self-Esteem and
Narcissism
By considering above the separate links between (a)
social relations and psychological self-regard, and (b)
psychological self-regard and behavioral strategy, we tested,
in each case, whether the data were either consistent or
inconsistent with self-regard serving the different indicative
and imperative functions specified by hierometer theory
and (the original version) of sociometer theory. However,
both theories additionally specify that the indicative and
TABLE 4 | Raw and partial correlation between social relations and interpersonal behavior.
Study 1 Study 2
Assertiveness Affiliativeness Assertiveness Affiliativeness
Raw correlations
Status 0.42∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.13∗∗
Inclusion 0.35∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.31∗∗
Partial correlations
Status 0.28∗∗ 0.06 0.26∗∗ −0.04
Inclusion 0.16∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.32∗∗
∗∗p < 0.001.
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imperative functions are coordinated: social relations should
affect self-regard, which should in turn affect behavioral
strategy. If so, then there should be a link between social
relations and behavioral strategy, which is mediated by
self-regard.
Table 4 lists, for both studies, all correlations between the
two social relations variables (i.e., status and inclusion) and
the two behavioral strategy variables (i.e., assertiveness and
affiliativeness). These appear in two forms: raw (top row) and
doubly partialed (bottom row).
The patterns—especially the raw coefficients—show that,
generally speaking, higher status and inclusion covaried
positively with assertiveness and affiliativeness. Thus, better
social relations generally prompted higher levels of both behavior
strategies. Beyond this—as the partialed coefficients best attest—
status covaried relatively more strongly with assertiveness, and
inclusion relatively more strongly with affiliativeness.
To test whether self-regard mediated these links, we
constructed, for each study, a structural equation model
(Kline, 2005). In both sets, we estimated all directional
paths using bias-corrected bootstraps on standardized scores
(Efron, 1987). As all models were fully saturated, and had
zero degrees of freedom, no goodness of fit indices applied
(Kline, 2005, p. 133). In the first set of models (Figure 2),
we entered status and inclusion as a pair of exogenous
predictor variables, self-esteem as an endogenous mediator
variable, and assertiveness and affiliativeness as a pair of
endogenous outcome variables. We permitted status and
inclusion to covary, and we did the same for assertiveness
and affiliativeness. In the second set of models (Figure 3), we
added narcissism as a second endogenous mediator variable,
and additionally permitted self-esteem and narcissism to
covary.4,5
Across both studies, the findings from the first set of models
(Figure 2) were remarkably consistent. Overall, self-esteem
significantly and substantially mediated the link between social
relations and behavioral strategy. Specifically, the indirect paths
between status and assertiveness via self-esteem always attained
significance, although the direct paths remained significant too.
Likewise, the indirect paths between inclusion and affiliativeness
via self-esteem always attained significance, although the direct
paths remained significant too. Furthermore, all paths, direct
and indirect, were positive in sign, suggesting a consolidatory
dynamic, with higher status prompting greater assertiveness
by raising self-esteem, and higher inclusion prompting greater
affiliativeness in like manner. Finally, the magnitude of the
4Note that, in principle, many other mediational models could have been
considered, some more piecemeal (e.g., involving only hierometer-relevant
variables), and others more comprehensive (e.g., involving ancillary variables such
as depression and anxiety). However, space limitations regrettably forbade us from
considering all of them. We took the defensible view that self-esteem, the canonical
form of self-regard invoked by both hierometer theory and sociometer theory,
should be tested as the primary mediator of links between social relations and
behavioral strategy, and that narcissism, a variant form of self-regard, should be
tested as an ancillary mediator.
5In the graphical representations of each model, two direct effects and error-
covariances are not displayed for ease of presentation; however, these were
included in the statistical models for purposes of estimation.
mediation was more marked for the agentic variables invoked
by hierometer theory than for the communal variables invoked
by (the original version of) sociometer theory. In particular,
the path from self-esteem to affiliative behavior was notably
weak.
Across both studies, the findings from the second set of
models (Figure 3) were also highly consistent. Overall, self-
regard—represented by the combination of self-esteem and
narcissism—again significantly and substantially mediated the
link between social relations and behavioral strategy. However,
the pattern of mediation differed markedly for the hierometer-
relevant agentic variables and the sociometer-relevant communal
variables. This time, the direct path between status and
assertiveness dropped to zero in one case, showing that the
self-regard “combo” completely mediated the link between
status and assertiveness. (The incomplete mediation observed
in Study 2 may have been due to its featuring, not the
full 40-item version of the NPI, but rather the abbreviated
16-item version, which sacrificed conceptual coverage for
administrative brevity.) Thus, the addition of narcissism to
the models, which lowered direct effects from around 0.20
to 0, substantially augmented the mediation of the status-
assertiveness link—again underscoring the value of assessing
self-regard in two different ways. In contrast, the addition of
narcissism to the model hardly affected the mediation of the
inclusion-affiliativeness link: as before, direct effects of around
0.30 emerged. This was primarily because the paths from
inclusion to narcissism were near-zero, despite the emergence
of strong negative paths between narcissism and affiliativeness,
and the positive paths from self-esteem to affiliativeness rising
slightly.
This first set of mediational findings fully supports hierometer
theory. The data are consistent with self-regard—especially when
jointly operationalized as self-esteem and narcissism—acting as
a psychological mediator that bridges the gap between status
and assertiveness. In particular, they are consistent with self-
regard tracking status (by rising or falling in tandem with it) and
regulating assertiveness (by making it rise or fall in tandem) to
help ensure that individuals navigate adaptively status hierarchies
by judiciously engaging in zero-sum contests (i.e., as their status
dictates).
Second, the mediational findings only offer at best partial
support for the original version of sociometer theory. In the
aggregate, the data arguably do not support it. Certainly, our
data suggest that self-esteem tracks inclusion, by rising (or
falling) in tandem with it. However, they also suggest that, at
the same time, self-esteem makes affiliativeness rise (or fall) in
tandem with it too. Sociometer theory would arguably predict the
opposite, namely, that lower self-esteem should prompt greater
affiliativeness, to help restore the fractured bonds of community
belongingness, regarded as so fundamental to survival. Yet
narcissism did vary inversely with affiliativeness, consistent
with one variant form of self-regard regulating behavior in
the required direction. At the same time, narcissism hardly
covaried with inclusion, thereby ruling it out as a mediator
to bridge the sociometer-specified gap between inclusion and
affiliativeness.
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FIGURE 1 | A side-by-side illustration of the hypothesized dynamics of hierometer theory and (the original version of) sociometer theory.
Mediational Analyses II: Self-Esteem,
Depression, and Anxiety
Self-esteem is known to covary inversely with most negative
emotions, in particular, with anxiety and depression (Baumeister
et al., 2003; Sedikides et al., 2004). Furthermore, some theories
(Price et al., 1994; Sloman, 2008) state that depression and
anxiety evolved to serve indicative and imperative functions
similar to those hypothesized by sociometer and hierometer
theory to be served by self-esteem. In particular, depression
per se has been hypothesized to activate a harm-minimizing
“yielding subroutine” (Price and Sloman, 1987) that facilitates
the emergence of stable “pecking orders” across species—
rather like hierometer theory proposing that low-esteem curtails
assertiveness to optimize competitive performance within
social hierarchies. In addition, social anxiety per se has been
hypothesized to keep people appropriately mindful of what
is socially acceptable lest they fall prey to public sanction—
similar to sociometer theory proposing that low self-esteem
signals to people their levels of social inclusion or relational
value are running dangerously low (Gilbert, 2001). Although
self-esteem might conceivably operate in concert with anxiety
and depression, both hierometer and sociometer theory would be
strongly validated if findings emerged that were consistent with
self-esteem playing a mediational role independently of anxiety
or depression.
Accordingly, to determine whether self-esteem uniquely
mediated the link between social relations and behavioral
strategy—that is, to test whether the predictions of hierometer
theory or sociometer theory held above and beyond the
predictions of alternative theories—we ran a further pair of
models parallel to the second set above, but replacing narcissism
either with depression (assessed in Study 1: Figure 4, top) or
anxiety (assessed in Study 2: Figure 4, middle). To facilitate inter-
model comparison, we also inverted the depression and anxiety
indices, such that higher scores represented lower depression (i.e.,
cheerfulness) and lower anxiety (i.e., calmness).
Compared to lone mediation by self-esteem (Figure 2), the
impact of adding either cheerfulness or calmness to the models,
as potential ancillary mediators, differed for the hierometer-
relevant agentic variables and the sociometer-relevant communal
variables. The path coefficients for status and assertiveness,
direct and indirect, hardly changed. The same was true of the
path between inclusion and self-esteem. However, the paths
between self-esteem and affiliativeness changed substantially:
they dropped to non-significance with the addition of either
cheerfulness or calmness to the model, ruling out self-esteem
serving any unique imperative function. Rather, the data in Study
1 were consistent with cheerfulness independently exhibiting
a consolidatory dynamic—with higher inclusion prompting
greater affiliativeness by increasing cheerfulness. Such indicative
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FIGURE 2 | The mediating effect of self-esteem. †p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
and imperative functions bear some similarity to those specified
by evolutionary theories of clinical disorders (Price et al., 1994).
In addition, a positive and significant path emerged between
status and cheerfulness, although not between cheerfulness and
assertive behavior—only partly in keeping with such theories.
In a similar vein, the path coefficients in Study 2 suggested—
again with self-esteem entered simultaneously in the model—that
calmness exhibited a consolidatory dynamic like cheerfulness:
higher inclusion prompted greater affiliativeness by increasing
calmness. However, and again mimicking the pattern for
cheerfulness, a positive and significant path emerged between
status and calmness, although not between calmness and assertive
behavior.
In sum, even when cheerfulness and calmness were included
in the models as co-mediators, self-esteem continued to show, in
near-unchanged form, the patterns of association with status and
assertiveness predicted by hierometer theory. However, although
self-esteem also continued to show associations suggestive of
tracking inclusion, any associations suggestive of behavioral
regulation disappeared. Yet, both cheerfulness (i.e., the inverse
of depression) and calmness (i.e., the inverse of anxiety) showed
the pattern consistent with the consolidatory dynamic previously
shown by self-esteem, in line with evolutionary accounts of their
adaptive function.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this article, we put forward, and empirically tested, a novel
theory of the evolutionary function of self-regard: hierometer
theory. This theory proposes that self-regard operates as part of
a system that enables individuals to navigate status hierarchies
adaptively. In doing so, individuals must make judicious
decisions about whether or not to enter risky zero-sum contests
that may not only be beneficially won but also harmfully lost. One
factor liable to predict the outcome of such contests is prior social
status. Accordingly, hierometer theory proposes that higher
(lower) prior social status promotes a behavioral strategy of
augmented (diminished) assertiveness, with self-regard acting as
the intrapsychic bridge—in particular, tracking social status in the
first instance and then regulating behavioral strategy in terms of
it. Note that the overall dynamic involved is consolidatory rather
than compensatory: higher rather than lower status is proposed to
lead to increased assertiveness. In this regard, hierometer theory
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FIGURE 3 | The mediating effects of self-esteem and narcissism. †p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
differs from dominance theory, which arguably implies that it is
losses in social status that prompt attempts to regain it (Barkow,
1980).
Hierometer theory also supplements and complements
sociometer theory, one leading theory of self-regard’s
evolutionary function. In its original version, sociometer theory
proposes that self-regard—in particular, self-esteem—operates
as part of a system that enables people to maintain a minimal
level of social acceptance, considered essential to survival. It
proposes that self-esteem tracks levels of social acceptance, such
that, if social rejection looms, a drop in self-esteem serves as an
intrapsychic warning signal, motivating individuals to regain
social acceptance by engaging in pro-social (i.e., affiliative)
behavior. Note that the dynamic involved is compensatory:
Lower rather than higher acceptance is proposed to lead to
increased affiliativeness. A revised version of sociometer theory
instead proposes that self-esteem tracks relational value more
generally; that is, how much one perceives that others value the
relationships that one has with them (Leary, 2005).
The explicit formulation of hierometer theory brings out a
number of unresolved issues with sociometer theory. The most
important of these has to do with the ambiguity over what “social
acceptance” means, and by extension, over what “relational value”
means.
In particular, individuals can become valued members of
society in one of two ways: (a) by being insiders rather than
outsiders—that is, by being liked, accepted, and included (Leary
et al., 1995); or (b) by being winners rather than losers— that
is, by being respected, admired, and deemed important (Magee
and Galinsky, 2008). Otherwise put, individuals can achieve
social inclusion or social status—two conceptually distinct, if
empirically correlated, constructs. The question then arises as to
whether and what extent self-regard tracks one versus the other—
the former being more communal in character, and the latter
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FIGURE 4 | The mediating effects of self-esteem and cheerfulness/calmness. †p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
being more agentic (Bakan, 1966; Huo et al., 2010). Whereas
hierometer theory proposes that self-regard tracks status, the
original version of sociometer theory proposes that self-regard
(self-esteem) tracks inclusion, whereas the revised version leaves
the issue open (i.e., tracks any form of relational value). Moreover,
both hierometer theory and sociometer theory propose, not only
that self-regard tracks social relations, but also that it regulates
behavior. Specifically, whereas hierometer theory proposes that
self-regard regulates assertive behavior, the original version
of sociometer theory proposes that it (self-esteem) regulates
affiliative behavior, with the revised version again leaving the issue
open (i.e., regulates any behavior relevant to relational value).
Accordingly, by (a) taking the agentic constructs specified by
hierometer theory, and the communal constructs specified by the
original version of sociometer theory, and by (b) operationalizing
them systematically and simultaneously at appropriate levels
of analysis (i.e., social, psychological, behavioral), it becomes
possible to test, via correlational and mediational means, and
controlling for overlapping variance between parallel variables,
whether and to what extent self-regard plays the indicative
and imperative functions specified by both theories. It also
becomes possible to test whether the dynamic involved is
either compensatory (such that lower self-regard, evoked
by lesser status or inclusion, prompts greater assertiveness
or affiliativeness) or consolidatory (such that higher self-
regard, evoked by greater status or inclusion, prompts greater
assertiveness or affiliativeness). In addition, it is possible to
test all the above with respect to two types of self-regard
(self-esteem and narcissism), and also controlling for potential
confounding variables of a clinical sort (depression and anxiety).
In the research reported in this article, we actualized all these
possibilities.
At every turn, the predictions of hierometer theory were
verified. In both studies, we found that self-regard, whether
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in the form of self-esteem or narcissism, correlated positively
with both status and assertiveness—consistent with self-regard
tracking the former and regulating the latter. In addition,
self-regard statistically mediated the link between status and
assertiveness—partially for self-esteem alone, but wholly for self-
esteem and narcissism combined, thereby highlighting the value
of considering both forms of self-regard jointly, rather than self-
esteem alone. The pattern of observed statistical associations
suggested that higher (lower) status increases (decreases) self-
regard which in turn augments (diminishes) assertiveness. This
suggests a consolidatory dynamic: those who have status adopt a
riskier behavioral strategy, and those who lack it adopt a safer one,
with self-regard acting as the intrapsychic bridge. Furthermore,
even when controlling for depression and anxiety—clinical
variables also hypothesized to serve an evolutionary role in
moderating levels of assertiveness—the correlations consistent
with the hypothesized indicative and imperative functions
remained robust, thereby raising the likelihood that self-regard
indeed acts as the crucial mediator.
Second, the predictions of the original version of sociometer
theory were sometimes verified and sometimes falsified, such
that, on the whole, the theory was not supported (subject
to some caveats below). In particular, self-esteem correlated
positively with both inclusion and affiliativeness—consistent with
it tracking the former and regulating the latter. Moreover, when
considered in isolation, self-esteem also statistically mediated the
link between the two. However, the pattern observed suggested
that higher (lower) inclusion increases (decreases) self-esteem
so as to augment (diminish) affiliativeness. This would imply
an indicative function in keeping with the original version of
sociometer theory, but an imperative function at odds with
it (i.e., decreased self-esteem should augment affiliativeness).
Furthermore, when competing clinical variables (i.e., depression
and anxiety) were entered into models alongside self-esteem, all
links to affiliativeness approached zero, thereby casting doubt on
whether self-esteem is an independent mediator of any dynamic,
consolidatory or compensatory. Finally, although narcissism did
correlate negatively with affiliativeness, it barely correlated with
inclusion; hence, as an alternative index of self-regard, narcissism
cannot play the role required by self-regard in the original
version of sociometer theory either. Note that our findings
here are generally in keeping with the accumulated empirical
record on sociometer theory to date, which reliably supports
the hypothesized indicative function for self-esteem (Leary et al.,
1995; Denissen et al., 2008), but only equivocally supports its
hypothesized imperative function (Maner et al., 2007; Twenge
et al., 2007).
That our findings for self-esteem were consistent with
hierometer theory, but not or not entirely with the original
version of sociometer theory, further suggests that, although
self-esteem is both agency-based and communion-based, it
is relatively more agency-based than communion-based—a
conclusion also reached independently by other researchers
(Wojciszke et al., 2011). Indeed, in this connection, Gebauer
et al. (2015) recently found, in two very large cross-cultural
studies, featuring self-reports and informant reports respectively,
that the Big Five personality trait of extraversion—the one most
related to agency and “getting-ahead”—uniquely predicted self-
esteem, whereas the trait of agreeableness—the one most related
to communion and “getting along”—did not. In addition, and
as expected, narcissism emerged as relatively more agency-based
than communion-based (Sedikides et al., 2002; cf. Campbell and
Foster, 2007), in that it entailed a deficit in communion for some
links (e.g., to affiliativeness) and a surfeit in agency for others (e.g.,
to assertiveness). Nonetheless, some links (e.g., to status) were
equally strong for self-esteem and narcissism.
We believe that the foregoing discussion illustrates how
our correlational and mediational findings—by being either
in keeping, or at odds, with different theoretically derived
predictions—serve either to provide support for, or to call
into question, the theories that yield those predictions, thereby
moving forward the investigation of the function of self-regard.
That is, even if correlation and mediation do not prove causation,
causal theories can nonetheless be tested by whether or not
observed patterns of correlation and mediation are consistent
with their predictions. In other words, although consistent
patterns do not decisively establish a theory, inconsistent patterns
do have the power to undermine it. As one of the progenitors
of sociometer theory has emphasized “[absent] measurement
error or methodological shortcomings . . . null correlations falsify
causal hypotheses (Baumeister et al., 2003, p. 9).” For example,
in the current research, a failure to find a unique positive
correlation between status and self-esteem, after controlling for
both inclusion and narcissism, would have called hierometer
theory into question, and unequivocally supported the original
version of sociometer theory, which emphasizes inclusion.
Especially as a first step toward validating a promising theory,
such correlational and mediational patterns are, at the very least,
informative. In any case, complementary experimental research
is now underway that has begun to establish the causal links
specified by hierometer theory (Mahadevan et al., 2015).
In defense of sociometer theory, however, at least two
caveats merit consideration. First, we focused on long-standing
conditions, at a social, psychological, or behavioral level.
Accordingly, we assessed all our variables in either chronic or
trait form. Had we instead focused on changing conditions,
and so assessed our variables in either acute or state form,
more evidence of a compensatory dynamic might have come to
light. Specifically, in line with the original version of sociometer
theory, acute drops in state self-esteem might have momentarily
augmented affiliativeness (Maner et al., 2007). Similarly, in
line with dominance theory, acute drops in self-regard might
have momentarily augmented assertiveness (Barkow, 1980).
Ultimately, the timespan over which relevant variables are
measured may be a critical moderator of, and a limiting
condition on, the applicability of hierometer and sociometer
theory. Nonetheless, given that links between constructs assessed
at a chronic and trait level have been previously adduced as
evidence for sociometer theory (Leary et al., 1995, 2001; Anthony
et al., 2007a; Denissen et al., 2008), it is legitimate that they be
adduced as evidence for hierometer theory, especially given its
novelty. To count such chronic links as evidence for sociometer
theory, but not for hierometer theory, would be tantamount to
discrimination.
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Second, our findings are arguably consistent with the revised
version of sociometer theory, which is equivocal about the type
of relational value that self-esteem tracks, and by extension,
the type of social acceptance that goes hand in hand with it.
Indeed, hierometer theory, and the original version of sociometer
theory, might each be considered complementary subsets of the
revised version of sociometer theory, if the latter is construed
very broadly as a theory which states that types of social relations
(status, inclusion), which constitute different types of relational
value, regulate types of behavioral strategies (assertiveness,
affiliativeness) via types of self-regard (self-esteem, narcissism).
If so, then our confirmatory findings for hierometer theory, and
mixed findings for the original version of sociometer theory,
would still suggest that the revised version of sociometer theory
holds truer for agentic variables than for communal ones.
CONCLUSION
It matters whether, in the social world, one is either a winner
or a loser, or an insider or outsider. Both outcomes seem to
independently shape how individuals feel about themselves, and
in turn, how they behave. But the pattern of data we obtained
is most consistent with the outcome of being a winner or loser
ultimately regulating how assertively or acquiescently individuals
behave. In particular, prompted by their levels self-regard—
people on an already winning trajectory seem motivated to
seek further wins, whereas those on a losing trajectory seem
motivated to avoid further losses. Such a dynamic system, which
serves to consolidate individuals’ existing statuses, arguably helps
them prudently navigate social hierarchies, by optimizing their
judicious participation in risky zero-sum contests.
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